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C}HAPTEIi I.
The Charactor and Scope of tho Inquiry.
The subject which this article cUSFCs involves a
question which has not been directly raisedt before the courts
with much frequency. If the amount of litigation is the
measure of imrortance, , az it is alt to be considercd in these
times when every one is so intelsely pactical, then the writ-
er's choice of a subject may be criticisd as bein- one of
not very -reat Irctical value. But this criticism, 7ill be
found, uron reflection, to be 7o :ewh t unjust and superficial.
The infrequency of litigation on the subject is due chiefly-
0
to the fact that th re hf, been a hesitancy in this country
to adopt the English doctrine, and answer the question af-
firmat ively.
7hether practical or not, howove", a question upon
which able jurists lilke Lor- Camibell, Lord Justice Brett,
Lore Selborne, ?3>r. Justice CroarLton anw rrIA on the one side,
'have C'iffered from 1dr. Justice Coleridge and Lord Chief Jus-
tice Coleridge on the othor hand, and' concernin- which the
higlest courts of various states Aiave -ocahed diro-tly op-
posite conclusions, must indcoed be a close and interesting
one, the study of which cannot be entirely without rrofit.
1ut the writer ventures to suEZest that the quection
is a very yractical one; one, in fact, which vitally concerns
both the commercial and the labor interests of our country.
This would be quickly :'-oticable if the answer was universally
in the affirmative, on account of the litigation which it
would give risc to, and the litr itations which it would place
upon the freedom which now reons coiy: ar tively undisturbed
in the commercial world; and because the souhdest and best
authorities, as the writer attempts hcrcinto show, have
answered the question in the nerativc, and thus protected
that commercial freedom from unwise restraint, shall nvo say
that the queption is any the less -ractical?
A zv.or-l also as to the score of this article. The
limits set by custom uron simaia- ". '-o'uctions forbid the
discussion he-rein of' the very live tor-its of the legality of
,4
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strikes and boycotts. But the question here discussed
arises, and should be rightly determined, before one enters
that domain of legal conrtroversy. The fact that this is so
is emphasized by the ill-adviseo, dicta which are to be found
frequently in judicial opiilons rendered in c3.Se5 arising out
of such labor t-ouble. The latest and most -m'oainent illus-
tration of this is to be found in the recent opinion of Un-
ited States Circuit Judge ?ift, in the Ann Ar Jor Railroad
strike case, which decision created great Curore in labor
cireles and has been the subject of much newspaper comment.
In the course of his opinion (See 54 Fed.IRep., 730, at page 740)
after referring briefly to the English cases and the M1ass-
achusetts case, which it is attempted to show herein are not
based upon sound yrinciples of law, and to the t; o Eew York
cases--- which are shown herein to be not in point at all ---
Judge Taft says,- "If a person, with rights secured by contrw t
may, in case of loss, recover d-mages from one not a -ar to
the contract, who, with intent to injure him, ino.uces a
breach of it, a fortiori cq one whose r-ights are secured
by statute recover damages from a -:erson who, with intent to
injure him, procures the violltion of those rights by another
-C-
and causes loss. " Ey way of yareinthepis, it -Light be noted
that the real intent --- the T-riT. ry L.oti 7e --- of the strih:-
ing engineers, vfms not to injureany one, but instead it vwas
a noble and philanthropic Turrose to benefit their fellow-
engineers by enabling ther t- obtain better compensation for
their labor. Had Judge Taft carefully investigated all the
authorities both pro and con, it is safe to yre-ict that he
would not have made this statement re-ara'in. the existence of
a right of action for malicious interference with contract at
com.on law. As the case which he was considering arose under
the statute known as the Intrr-state Commerce la.:, the above
statement may be dismissed as a mere dictum. But it suffices
to illustrate the necessity of a correct us-dersta ding of the
principle involved, for incorrect dicta are often a source
of imuch annoyance, and are liable to Irove dangerous stumbling
blocks in future ,ears.
It will thus be seen that it is the purpose of this
discussion to lead up to, but not across, the threshhold of
the labor problems. And it is only after this precefing in-
quiry is properly answerea, that one is -repared to enter upon
an intelligent consideration of the legal que :tions :,hich
labor disturbances give rise to.
CHAPTER II.
The Origin and Extent of the En-lish Doctrine.
In the year of our Lord, the one thousand eight
hundred anid fifty-first, arid of the reign of her Gracious
Majesty, Queen Victoria, the fourtenth, there lived in the
city of Londo., England, a Good and loyal subject bearing the
name of Benjbmin Lumley. Mr.Lumley wia s the lessee and pro-
-prietor of her 1:ajesty'e Theatre, in the said city of London,
wherein ho caused to be rroduced from time to time, enter-
tainments of ar eleva<ting and ennobling nature, from which
his patrons derived g,eat pleas-ure, and 7imself great profit.
In order to add to both the rleasure and the yrofit, in Novem-
b-r, 1851, he entered into an c...o ementwith 1iademoisellc
Johanna Wagner, of Berlin, cantatriee to the Court of His
Majesty, the King of Prussia. and a singer of evident great
renown, by which she bound herself to sin- at her :Jajesty's
Theatre in Loneon for three ::onths forom Aril 1, 1852, for the
-C--
modest remuneration of 400 -7ounch 4t-,l1nc ijc:r ':onth, and
further agreed that during sai. time she uould 1-ot use her
talents at any other t-(t-c or concert without tte express
consent of -r Lumley. But there vrac in te" groeat city of
London anothur theatre, a-io;: . t'.o Covent C-arden Theatre,
the proprietcr of w:hich Y-as ,ir. Th-edcc Gyc. o h. Gye
somehow conceive, the notion that it would. be a nice thing to
have :1iss 7-o.r sing :t his theatre, or, at any rate, that
it would grieve his soul to have his business rival, L.
Lurley, "iz-A ' orct of wealth because of le- talents.
So he, with fI( Jx- c cxisting contract, and with
a deliberate our.ose -o injure his rIvoK rin:d better himself,
made the t-'irndonna a better- offer to come and sing at his
theatre instead of :at l-r Lumlcy'. Atc ti-.-: are :ot of
necessity philanthrojhists, and as the ILademoiscllc was sing-
ing for lucre as w Eell a for faic, she accepted. the -ro-oos itiCR
deliber.tely brohe her contract with Li2rley, and proceeded
to delight the o. iences at the Covert n ar den Theatre with
the rare and exquisite richness of uer aelodious voice.
Mr Lumley felt that he had been deeply w,--onged, and although
11iss YVager'  notes did not r:ing thCcvv-'h the arches of his
-0-
theatre, there was -iiisic in t,,, air all ',bout there, never-
thelec.s, for he forthvith cau7ed c ie courts of justice to
'huimso to senalh,in his efforts to rrotect his rights and re-
i w,'oigs. And out of the iti-ation ;hich followed
there arose tv-c e ..... t leadiuc cases in English jurisprudence.
In one of them, the doctrine ;.s established that a court
of equity vill by ]-e.*. .' ci -nuction restrain the breach
of a contract for personal services, contining bot- a -os-
itive and a negativoagreemnnt., even though it cannot enforce
the specific :crformance of the entire contract. (Lumley v.
Wagner, I Dcg.M.& G. , 601. )
Iraving obtained such an injunction restraining
Miss Y'ager from singing at the coment. Garden Theater, and
enjoining Gye not to employ her there, Lumley next turned his
attentLion T ore atcl
attention articularly on Gye, and sued him in a court
of law. to recover da .ages for -ais malicil.,s interference
vith the contract tha:t - ben "...a betwveen himself (L-tmley)
and Miss Wagner, and for Llaliciosly enticing and procuring
her to brea2- such contract. Gye deiru. to Luley' decla-
ration on the ground tia-t tho ' ,ts stated did not constitute
a sufficient cause of action, but upon the 2-r.-,ment of such
- l-
demurer-t, the court of Queen's 3enc_ overr1leda the s ame, and
held that m interfoence with a contra:t was ai
aetion:uble w::ron-. (Lul 2. Gye, 2 1llis & 31acKburn,216)
It is the doctr ine lai! dowu for the first ti-e in the latter
case, which it is the purpose of this article to consider.
As this case is thcrefore the corner stone upon which we
shall either erect our mv-!o.' tructure of a legal wron and
the renedy ther'efor, or else rejct a- "uin- unfit to build
upon because it is iaid in the quicrlssa.ds of false and erron-
eous reas onin-, neither time nor s-ace can be deemed
miss-ent which is d- oted to ex.inirc somewhat at ieigth
the ratio decidendi of t-Kt case.
Lumley v. Gyc, a lreadvy intimat (u, was a case of
the first impression. it w s conced e on both sides that a
right of arction had fo:' t LDg izo existed in favor of
a master against a 0eion woo enticed v.ay his servant. But
here the coon legal npathlw ,y ii - , and the o::-osing coun-
sel went in different dircetions, each, of course, asserting
that his roa- 7,3s the right one. It was urged on the part
of the -0fcn< ut that the iill1 was an anomalous one,
which had becowio ongrefe u .on the l: ii the days of slavery,
-. L
when the servant was considered the 7y-roperty of the master,
and that it should not be enlarged, but should be confined to
those cases in which the strict relation of' master and servant
existed, and was not A."I'licable to the ca of a cT-matic
artiste. On the other hand, it was contended t'at the mas-
ter's ri-hl of actico above alidej 'o was but a branch of
the general rule. Iaid don:r Ccryr's Li cst, Action on the Case
(A), that "i-n al case , cre man has tempor-l loss or dam-
age by the wrong of another, he may have an action on the
case to I, -.i .ircd ±n C d-l.ges" " and that a:-i,-- thiat principle
the malicious s-X intentional yrocurement of the bracli of any
contract was an injury for which a cause of action would lie.
'7hile a majority of the court decided in favor of the plain-
tiff, they diffe(2C. snerenhat as to t:ie ba-is of the decision,
and each one w;rote a-i opinion. Crompton J., held that the
principle of giving a cause of action for enticing away a
servant was a-iclicable to a case where the oeendant malic-
iously procures a party under contract to render exclusive
personal sevice for a specified tisic, as w As liss Ya-ner, to
refuse to -ive such service; but he declined to holf the
broader doctrine that a- action would lie for malicious in-
-1.-
terference with any conract, as being unnecessary to the
decision of the case, althou-"A ho c-idonce'2 a stron leaning
in favor of that view. Erle J., too'k 'he broad vie..: that
"he who jrocures maliciously a (flmagc. to another by a vio-
lation of hic right, ought tc be made to indernxiify; and that
whether he -roourcs an actiona,)le won-, or a breach of con-
tract." i7'1tmana position about midway between
the other two, and in favor of' the 1laintiff. But Sir John
Coleridge, J. wrote a very strong, able, and learned dis-
seriting ozinion, which has been much admired, and the rea-
sonin;, of Ycrich seems to the rresent writer to be conclusively
convincing. Ile maintainedr with ,reat force that it was a
general rule of lax7 tint thne remedy for breach of contract
is confined to the contracting parties; that the parties enter
into the contr°act with that ndr'tthat as man is a
free moral agent, the broach of contract is the act, not of
the third -party, but of the party to the contract hirself;
that an intcr.-f.ernce x.ith the contract if not malicious,
is concedcdly rnot actionable; and thAtt 'to draw a line be-
tween -;.dvice, persuasion, enticement and p-rocurement is prac-
tical:- i:;possible in a court of justicc; wlho shall say how
-13-
Tmuch of a free agents resolution flows from the interference
of other 11inOs, or tic iflriT:JILVnt resoluti~n )f his own?
This is a matter for the co suist rathcr t1han ta jurist; still
less is it for the juryman." He then goes on to :oint out
that the right of action by t acastor to s:t f < 1iei" £'::ay his
servant is an admitted exception Io the above rule, which had
its origin in the fa-mous historical Statute of Laborers, pass-
ed in 1349, in the twenty-hird year of the reigh of Edrand
the Thir. This statute was enacted in consequence of the
great mort I-,?ty vhich 7revailed -m-ong the low,.,er classes on
account of the ravages of the Dlach De th, with the result of
producing a great acarcity of menial labor. This occurred
during the transition period from serfdora to free labor, and
the statute had a most important bearing on the great social
revolution which ;as then in Iyrog-ess. (See Green's History
of the English People, Vol. 7., p  405 Ct seq.) The Statute
of Laborers it,-elf one who (-ads t iowI in this
day of freedom, as a most tyrannical and opressive measure;
and is a strilking land u aa of the harriers which have been
placed from time to time in the 1;ath-.>iy of -- ogress and en-
lightened freedom. in the prcabplc to the statute it is said:
-14-
"Many seeing the necessity of masters, c.:.d great scarcity
of servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive
wages, and somie rather beg in idlenless, thl: by labor to get
their living; we considering the grieveous incommodities,
whtch of the lack especially of plou-hmen and of such laborers
may hereaCter come, have orained,," etc. It was then en-
acted that "every man and woman, of whatsoever condition,
free or bond, able in body, and vithnin the age of three score
years ------------------- not having of 'As own whereof he
may live, nor lands of his own about the tillage of which he
may occupy hi.self, and not serving ar:y other, shall be
bound to serve the employer waho shall require him to do so,
and shall take only the uages which were accustomed to be
taken in the neighborhood where he is bound to serve" two
years before the plague began. It was further made an offeirg
yunishable by imyrisorz.ent, for arn M170," reaer, or other
laborer or servant to depart from service before the expir-
ation of the time of service a-reed on; and no one is to re-
ceive or retain, any such offender in his service under like
pain of imrisonment.
Aftor recounting this Statute, Judge Coleridge by
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c~~rcft'J.~~~ W::,r.v4  -r ,, ti ~( i1~ reafter goes
on to shwc: that this statute W -.rv the fondtion ,f the action
for the enticin- away of a hir-o , ant ; .nd roaches the
conclusion that such right of action, being a-, excertion to
the zeneral rule of la.vz, sho'~id be li'aitcd rathor than extend-
ed, and '~mas not aprllcaDblo to the c:lse at bar. But Judge
Colegels able oi4on was a-ftero all onily a "issenting one,
so the demurrer was overrulec, the defendant was allowed to
plead, and. the case went to trial. The doctrine of law thus
established by th> cage w:s ver y eriously questioned., but
as the defendant :'ecove-'da ver'-tict ui ron the t-ial (see Smith's
Lea.dling Cases, 8ti Ef., Vol. 1., 5:. 08) there was no or-or-
tuTity for carrying the ease to the Court of ror, and the
highestO~i 4,to° 0,.
highest aithrity uyron the -rorositon could not be obtained.
After a lapse of nearly three decadehs, however, thIe
doctrine of Lurley v. Gyo, c me up squarely for eonsideration
in 1881, in the Court of A in Boe v. 1a. L.R.
Q.B.Div., 333. This was an action for eading a s:illed
workman, who, ith a fc others, a secret rrocs
for manufacturin :lazed bric::s, to brao): his contract wit"h
the -ilaintif for -clusivc se-vice for 2ive years. The
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decision in Lurley v. Gyc, it v:ill be noticcd, ritcd upon two
propoitions, viz.'-
(I) That -I & 1-1 will iic for the procuring the
breach of any contract, when t. ,siC is done with a malicious
intent;
(2) That the exce-tional rule a-plica-ble to contracts
between master and servant was equally xoli )e to any con-
tract for personal services; although the majority of the -.7
court leaned more strongly on the second proposition than on
the first. Thit ii Dovrn vs. --1a.11, tc 3ourt repudiated
the second anr- ado-jted the first -'oi .cqle as the basis of
its decision, and laid down the broad :octrine that a man who
induces cue of' two rarties tc a contract to bred- it, intend-
ing thereby to injure the other, does that other a:- action-
able wrong. Particilar strss is iaid on thle point that to
be actionable, tl:e :nterfcoence mist be malicious. Speaing
of the second Irowosition, Brett, J. in 1owe>. v. Hall, states
in effect that MIr. Justice Coler:1-e 7.-.7 right in maintaining
that t he riastr act" f.:- 2 'ioi _ s ervant was
based ':on t-.e StAt'ite of' Laorers, and should not be c::tend-
ed, and adds that "if, in orThr o .. ort Lumley v. Gyc,
-17
it had boon necessary to aec-t this (s-econd) :frolosition,
we should have much Coubted., to say 1L,' J ast.----------------
But we thinh the case is better m ort.'n upon the first and
larger doctrine. Ir Bowen vr. Hall there was also a 'is-
sentin~;g oninion, and the judge who wrote it s also a Col-
eridge, being none other than the Right Hon. John DuL-ne, Lord
Coleridge, the then and now Lord'L Chief Justice of England.
With great fo-er uu alearnoss, he lays dovn the doctrine that
"an action does not and ought not to lie against a third per-
son for maliciously and injuriously enticing and procuring
another to break a contract in a case where the relation of
master and servant in a strict sense d -oes not exist.,' He
then goes on to say,- It ls I believe admitted that if a man
maliciously endeavors to persuade another to break a cdntrac%
but fails in nis endeavor, the malicious motive is not in
itself a cause of action. it is, I believe, also admitted
------- that if a man enreavors to *ersuade another to
break his contract and succee(s in his endeavor, yet if he
does this without what the lw calls'malice' the damage which
result% however great, is iot in itref' a cuIse of action;
I mean, of course, a cause of action- against him. But if
the damage which is not in itself actionable be joined to a
motive which is not in itself actionable, the two together
form a cause of action. This scnu a straige conclusion."
Then after meeting the arrrnments that the actions for libel
and conspiracy are analogous to this by showing that in each
of these cases there is a aronjful act as well as a malicious
motive he adds,- "I do not know,exc ?t ln the case of Lumley
v. Gye, that it has e-rer bee: h-lelK' tf t conduct of the same
person for doing the same thing under the same circumstances
with the same result is actionable Dr not actionable according
to whether his inward motive was selfish or unselfish for
what he did. i think t:,e inquiries to which this view of
the law would lead arc dangerous and inexoeient inquiries
for courts of justice; judges are not very fit for them, and
juries are very unfit. i think, therefore, that Lumley v.
Gye, should be overruled." In the case again, however,
logic and sound reason wce-'e overcome by votes, and so the
conelusions of Lord Chief Justice have passod into iistory,
not as an aut'o-itative exrposition of the lavbut merely as
the individual orinion of a dissenting judge. The result and
effect of these tWo cases is t'nat, in Lnglish law, where the
-10-
decisions are of biniCing force, ,.hile a cont-act oce not in-
rose a positivo oblirration it:on a person v:A:- is not a yarty t
it whereby ho ca., be comrolle, cto -- -!sor i act or thing, yet
it does imro~e U:on him -- eC , a' a of
which 1-ic nust refrain from doin g t-iJ.!ngs vhich he might other-
wise do freely; that is, he must resr~ect the co::tractual tie
and not int,;rmeddle t,,'cr:.7ith; and if he does so, from a
selfish motive, he can be mulcted in _'amagC therefor. In
other words the obligation created by contract, :-ot merely
for personal services, but of any :ind or nature whatsoever,
is a res which is the subject of ownershi-, and the obliee
will be I-rotected as owuner of the same. it is as if that
vague, intargible and mettlphysical cont;ct, known in the law,
as the meeting of Tinds, ... .menti, wich brings a
contract into being, at the sane :.omcnt erecte' about such
contract a sort of invisible barbed-wire fence, within the
bounds of which no thir- rerson can venture save at his peril.
In Lu ley vs. Gye, the court ly limited the
princirle to the case of contraots for exclusive -ersonal
services. in Bowen vs. Kall, the cont -act o,_r -rocuring
the breach of wiich the §efc,-" ::t 'vcs vuc" was also a contract
-20-
for such service. But the reasoning of the court was not
confined to such casce, and the -rinci--lc as laid dovm by the
prevailing judges an: a-, o-,--ose by Lord Chief Justice Color-
idge is applicable to the ,-Lhole field of contracts. it
seems theref'-re, that it :ould make -,o -iflerince whether
the contract were for personal services, for the sale of
goods, for t-e -ayu._ cxt of rioney u.opon a promissory > ote, a
promise to marryor any kind of cont-ract; ir any and all cases
if a third party interferes and procures a breach and does
so maliciously, a right -f action will lie against him. In
passing, it may be of intrn-est to oetc that while Bowen vs.
Hall settles the :rinetylc of lD.Vr conclusively, aid leaves
it no longer an open ques tion in Tngland, yet it does not meet
with unanimous app.roval even by loyal Britons. That eminent
English law writer, Sir 'illis R. Anson, in his admirablo
work on the Law of Contracts gives the doctrine an appar-
ently reluctant endorsement, while the able ani brilliant
Sir Frederick Polloch characterizes the decision in Lumley vs.
Gye as"anemralous at best" and swallows it with a r--ry face as
if it were a bittc pill. (See Anson on Contracts, L:mowlton's
edition, p. 277; Polloch on Torts, p. 451). And the doc-
-21-
trine of Lumley vs. Gye hac been quostioned in a very recent
article by ,,o ,.E.Ormsby on 'Iialice in the Law of Torts"
In Law Qarterly Reviev, Vol. VIII. , p. 4 .
C 11P TTK I I.
The Attitude of the American Alit'o:,iies on the Question.
Having considered the English doct-inc, '. next
naturally inquire, what :position hive the American Courts
taken on this question? The right of action for enticing
away a menial servant had, as has already,, ointed out, become
a settled princi.le of lax- lon, before the Americ-n Revolution,
and in a large majority of the states the doctrine seems to
have been received and aee-ert,' a! art Df our inhcritar.ce
from the --=ther county, ruh. of it aood, nd some of it bad,
but all of which c-are i. v.ithout questi~ni:, a to its origin
or soundness under the -rotecti -  folds of i-t sacrvt heir-
loom }no.n as the "CoIT :.n Lay:. " This -principle ha been so
generally recognize( that but a fci' leo. in- ca.ses need be
cited. (See WoochTvard vs. Vashburn, 3 Dnio, 3GO; Bixby vs.
Dunlap, 50 N.H., 450; same case, 22 Am.!Rcp., 475, and note
following; Noice vs. Bro:.-n, 3' TI.J.L., 0; Anes vs. Rail-
way Co., 117 Mass., i).
But ie vie come to the 7jbaar' QectiO of the English
courts that a right of action lies for nalicious interference
with .y contract, we find the American courts in inharmonious
discord; a few follow it to its full extent, others reject
it in toto, and still others tahe a -osition, which is neither
logical nor graceful, about haalf-way between the two.
Let us examine the rrincical authorities. Probably
the leading case citeC as sxi: ortin the En:lish doctrine is
Walker vs. Cronin, (107 T.asc., F ) ecided in 1871, whic
was beFore the Th.glis> Court of A.:eal had pabsse upon the
case of Boweri vs. Hall. in this case the rlaintiff, who was
a shoe manufacturer, sued the cfendant for, unlawfully and
without justifiable cause, inducing several si~oenacrs em-
ployed by him to bo'oaK their oot 'cts, and leave lils service.
It was held that he could recove-, Tells,j., stating the
princi-clcin v as followis,- "Uvery one has the right to
enjoy the fruits anld advantages of his own ente-- ise, ilndus-
try, shill and credit. VE h.s _-,o r-irht to be -rotected
against competition; but he has a right to be -iee frou
malicious and :anto-l interference, di-turbanco or annoyance.
If disturbance or loss come as a rc t of comtetition, or
the exercise of li'le rightp - othcr , it -s dam-l-. absque
iniuria, unless some su: crior ri-ht by 3ont-%Pt or otherwise
is interfered vwith. hIt if it comes from the mrecly wanton
or malicious acts of others, -'itho.t the jiostificatiD§ of
competition or the service of any interest or l:ful ruri:0ose,
it then stands u!on a difforent footing., And futhcr on in
ly
speaking of the gener alconcede'o right of action for enticing
away a servant, he says, "It -1ms sometimcs been supposed that
this doctrine spr-n frori the English Statute of Laborers, and
was confined to me-wial service. But we are satisfied that it
is founded 'iyon the legZl rigt c'eriveC from the cont-act,
and not merely v on the relation of mastcr and servant; and
that it ay:.l_es to all contracts of elorlyment, if not to
contracts of every description." He cites in su-L-ort of
,is view Lumley vs. Gye, and several old cases of one 1ind or
another where d='a-es ,-.:,re allowed for the i-;az.ton intorfer-
ence of one person with tre affairs of another, as for examrle,
slander, enticing wife to remain av.;ay froim her husband, etc.,
etc. Eut in all of the latter cases, it seers to the present
-i, --
writer, the:-e can bc fo'Le not only a '7rougful niotive, but a
wrongful act a2s well. in an able article on 'The Boycott
as a Groun" for Damages" p,?.blished in 1887 (21 PL.Law Review,
509) Mr. Jo.n -K. Wiigorc, of Boc'to,...... of Wahor vs.
Cronin, says,-at rage lO, that it "is a much1 quoted case,
and emphasizes a -istinction betw'.een a violent or fraudulent
interference and orfdinary orsuas ion. The court goes further,
however, and. hel,- that ovcn t''ulteful persuasion, vwhen malic-
ious, is actionable. This, i venture to say, was incorrect.
Of the decisions cited therein or this ipoint ntot one supports
it. The distinction ,-ust rest, not upon the quality of the
motive, but ulon the nature of the outw'ard act. There is no
more persistent and yet no -.ore unfounded notion, than that
motive --- I do not say intention --- can become the turning
ioint of civil liability --- no notion more fitted to reverse
legal relations and to -:.ae chaos out of definite rrinciple."
In Dudley v-. Briggs, 141 Mass., 502 (1330), the
plaintiff had for several years published biennially a direc-
tory of Bristol County, and -r- .opa-ring to issue another in
due season, when the -lefendant came upon the scene, represent-
ed to the patrons of the plaintiff that he ha-- . urchased the
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plaintiff's businer-', and sold then a Ii-roctory boarii the
same name as that usuai. y issued b, the lai-ntiff. He sued
for damages, invoh ing the aut&i rity of' Lwmley vs. Gye and
Waler vs. Cronin, but ailc the c~urt .x:-res. d it al.7:roval
of those eases, it decided against the 7laintI f's r'i-ht to
recover, becausc there was no actual conr'act bet.:Oe. him and
his .atrone. And yet, he-e was :.ot only malice, but an in-
depcndent wirongful act, to wit, false representations :
The Suypreme Court of Lorth Carolina in 1371 in
Haskins vs. Royster, 70 N.C., 011, ar2Yclied the doctrine of
Lumley vs. Gyc, to a case where the defendant induced several
Ucro-ners that is, farm laborers worh ing land on shares, to
break their contract with Ihe plaintiff, and in so doin - over-
ruled the ecision of that enient jurist and able writer,
Judge Albioi,:. Tourgee, in the lower court. Rodman, J.,
who wrote the opinion, after stating that the princ.le is
settled that maliicious interfe-e nce with a contract for perso-
al services is actionable, follows it with a sentimental and
rhetorical flourish, thus,- "It need scarcely be said that
there is nothing in this princirle inconsistent ,-:ith personal
freedom, else we should not find it in the laws of the freest
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and most enlightened States in the world. It extends im-
partially to every grade of service, from the o t brilliant
and best raid to the .ost homcly, and it sheltcrs our neare- t
and tende-cst domestic rol.tions from the interferenice of
malicious intermeddlers. it is -ot derived from any idea
of rroperty by the one rarty in the other, but is an infererce
from the obligation of a contract freely made by competent
persons." He then follows with an extensivG quotation from
the opinion in Walker vs. Cronin, which he heartily endorses.
In 1877 the question again came before the Supreme
Couft of' orth Carolina in Jones vs. Stanley, 70 N.C., 357.
The plaintiff had made a contract with a railroa2 company
of which the defendant was :resident and Superintondent by
which said company agreed to transport from v.rious points on
their road to :.iorehead City, a large nunber of cross-ties,
which the plaintiff had contract.l to lelivor in Cuba. After
the contract had been partly performed, the defendant malic-
lously, and for the ury-ose of injuryin- the ::laintiff, that
.nL , -n the plitif t
is, to vent a personal spite, refused as an of :icial of the
Railroad Company to complete the czntract. The -laintiff
sued him individually, and was allowed to recover. Rodman,
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J., the same judge who wrote the orpinio1 in Haskins vs.
Royster, after referrins to that cc-sc, dis-oses of this one
very briefly as follows,- "The same reasons cover every case
where one perf'on maliciously i-sue a:-other to brclaI a
contract with a third person. It is not confined to con-
tracts for service., Vrhile t'ie :.rinci-le av stated in the
cases heretofore considerer' has been broad enough to cover any
kind of a contract, this is the first, and furthernore, the
only cse where the principle has been actually applied to
a contract other than for personal services. Be it said to
the credit of North Carolina, therefore, that, having adopted
the -rincirle, it has haC the courage to apply it logically
to its fullest extent!
The -osition thus tahen by the North Carolina court
is in contramist- ne-i-en to that t-e3cn by the Supreme Court
of Maine in I rwood vs. 7ilIson, 75 "3e., 225 (1883) where a
right of action was dciie the l aintiff a-ainst the defendant
for inducing, with -ross malic,alK almost by actual co-
tion, the te!:ant of the rlaintiff to bresaX his contract for
the lease of a h'.elling Louse, eters, J. , in the course
of his orinion, after a.:-UovinI of Lumley vs. Gye and Bowen
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vs. Hall as appileal to rei' 'ueO eo!t- . sys ,- "Arty man may
advise allother to brei:. a contract, if it be not a contract
for srsonal ervices. lie may use any lawful influence or
means to make his advicc pr-evail. In such a case, tho law
deems it ,-ot wise or practicable to inquire into the motive
that irs'izatc. the !Cr' icc. 1I1 rcrci -ct rr-y be morally and
not legally wrong." But the learned. court fails to explain
why it is any more leally wrong to interfere with a contract
for personal service t .i it is with :any other hind of con-
tract. This position is almost ludicrously illogical.
In C7irley vs, AtL:inson, 1 South.Rcp., 034, the
Supreme Court of Floria in 1S87 chan-rd the personal service
contract shoe over to the otter foot, so to spesk, by holding
that a malicious interrercuce wvith a contra-~t whereby an
emyloyee loses his -osition, Sive . a right of action by such
emrloyee against the -rty so it rfering, f the English
doctrine be deeme' at all worthy of oaUroval which, however,
we de--y, thio cc lust be ac law, for it is
a clear application of the .:, . olf s ing that "I:hat is
sauce for the -oose is sauce for the _a._der."
Ft-ane to s ', the foctrino under : iscussion seems
-30-
to have never been consi'7cred by one of the ;_tc.ling courts in
America, namely, by t-.(" .Yo- Court of -71 . s
must be aue to the £ nact th the 13.7-y('rs in this state have
not had faith en-owh- in. t.rincir:le to brn-- a:1 action under
it. In a recent c--.e at E-cci3.l 7erm, ho ,:: cr, --owing out
of the 7'in'7,1 nton cijar t- icz of a year or :o ao, a wvell
consid ered and able o-:it ton -.s delivered by ion. Yfaltcr
Lloyd Smith, Justice of the, ewce Court, in the course
of 7-.ich, sye ahi-rc of the so-called conz.on lay.:- action for
e:-ticinr. -_ a scrvz-.t h ,o - ,- iTf't this "octrine, a!-
thou-nh never ovrrulec'Iaa never, to Iy ,_ov:ldc, been ex-
Tlicitly held in the courts of this state. I am not satis-
fied Th the reason of 7 -n --, ,ccse of --:o other
7-tr c 7 10 . 1 -1 '_
contract _oef a.. rc-n_ nself lable ._ for tort by in-
ducing its viol .ticn tv " rsuasisn. i can see o reason why
the contract oD i7ervice "Loei o :ac excc tion. The
servant is the oatal i.' ia.h: of th -a.tm'. le contracts
with the -t m "li .... r0t-e cornon law,
tee servant' o c iti - " c nr' 'ffc','ent. 1isi S ositri
was more t--at of a slave. ._t in civil-Zation
the _eoason fo' the rule has c'ti-_,.ol-: .. It is, at
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least, a matter of -,rave oubt whether such ri 'ht of action
will ever bc sustaine'2 in this state. RoOers vs. Lvarts,
17 N.Y.Sup., 204 (Doce. 101). Jud-c Smith' o in
this caso has recently boc f, by the (;oeral Torm in
Reynolds vs. U-verett, 2 L.Y.Su>:., S06 (L%.rch, 193). if
that be the of tle ow Yor courts, it may be as-
seted with confidence that the doct-ine of Lu mn.ley vs. Gyc,
which, as we have seen, h:Cd its founitain he-.f in the master's
action for the enticing aar y cis servant, will not meet with
any arrroval hero, should any amrnitious litigant atteript to
have it aT:?1Idc.
But in tw-o recent cases in tLhe Court of Anweals of
Kentucky, the entire L;,n-lish dootrine as established by
Lumley vs. Gye and Bowon vs. Hall has been squoarely u: for
consideration, aaCd h.s been disa::rovel and rejected abso-
lutely and completely in two able ;rinions which, it seems to
the -rresent writer, -lust co;nmend themselves as rorarlably
careful and convincing, to evC2rv earnest stuc,...nt who is iiapar-
tially seehing for the tn-'e doctrine, without a -rrecolceived
rrejudice or bias either to the one viewY or the other.
The first case wa-s Chw§ ers va'. 7aldwin, 1F S..Rep.,
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57, which was decided Jany. 13, 1891. The question before
the Court was whether a right of action would lie for malici-
iously inducing a person, who had contracted to sell his crop
of tobacco to the rlaintiff, to break said contract. The
answer was, ,s indicated, in the negative. This was followed
whichjust a week later by a decision in a caseAwas the exact coun-
terpart of Lumley vs. Gye, being an action to recovr damages
for maliciously inducing the noted actress, Mary Anderson,
to break her contract to appear at the Masonic Temple Theatre
in Louisville. Following out the reasoning of the prior
case, the court held that there was no logical distinction
between service contracts, and those of any other nature;
that even the so-called common law action for enticing away
a servant had no foothold in that state, except so far as
provided by statute; and, therefore, that the plaintiff could
not recover. (2oulier vs. Mcauley, 15 S.W.RoP., 60).
Turning to the law viriters, as distinguished from
judicial decisions, v7e fin-7 here also a lac- of harmony.
The English doctrine is r071Iiate- in effect by Judge Cooley
(se Cooley on Torts, 2nd 581); while it is vigorously
upheld by Lyne S. Metoalfo, Jr., the editor of the Central Law
Journal in a noto which he ap:;enA5 to the rcport of the case
of Chambers vs. BalAV'in (Cnnt.L.J., Vol. 32, p. 2175). JIr.
Bishop, evidently w ithout haying given the matter much ser-
ious consideration, virtually m-,--ovos the Bn,-lish doctrine
(Bishop on No:-Contract Lao-, SeN. 13). Aside from these
authorities there are sevmrul magazine articles which dis-
cuss the effect and ay lK tioi - tetri'.o, but as they
ass ime at tne- outset that the .octrine is good law, they throw
no particular light upon the present discussion.
3riefly to review the Americar authorities, then,
it will be seen that while 1torth Carolina on the one hand en-
dorses the English view, Kentucly goes to the other extrome
and rejects it, while L1assachucetts and I,.haine may be said to
tah.e a position about -Lldwmr between the two and hold that it
is at least applicable to contracts for personal services.
It may also be fairly inferred from Burgess vs, Carpenter, 2
Rich, S.C., 7 (1370) that that state would reject the English
view. And Jones vs. Blocher, 43 Ga., 331, which is fre-
quently cited as supporting such view is purely a case of
master and servant, and therefore not in point.
The law in America may therefore be considered as
-34-
une-,ettlec, With lPohars a sii-htcijit of al thority favor-
ilfl tKF'~Y~t rin of a right of fztion o- ,a licious interfer-
ence .ith contracts for r.er..o ,al vi2s oIlly.
CIAPT YR IV.
7hat is the True Doctrine?
Should a right of action be allowed for maliciow
interference with contract or not? it must be adnitted
that the question is a close om<,av1 a nice one. Ethically,
morally, and sen:t iment ally, prob ably, the ans,.er is naturally
in the affirmnative. The-re is a :cru12.' iotion, esp,cially
in the min'-s of the laymen, that the law 17ill compel every
-erson to "Imind his own busine-s" or suffer for not doing so.
But when wre come to analjrz t-I quiestion, and test it by the
application of fixcd legal nprinciples, we are almost inev-
itably frrce6 to ansv'e' the cueption in the neative. Let
us briefly consider the reasons Wrr this is so.
At the outset, let us y t aside all cases where
there is any fraud, decertion, oris-e:-esentatio, r coercion,
as a resnilt of which thc- intermciTlc," roduces a b-each of the
contract. Here tho'-e is not only r malice, but a ooncofco ly
wrongful act. Here the br,-ach is not the voluntary act of
the party to the contract, but i real is overcoac
by the deception or co~reion DE' the thir' Tarty. Such cases
are clearly 'istimgisc- from the one n,1er iscussion and
a right of action obviously lies against the iuron- doer-
(Benton vs. Pratt, 2 3" el-., 85; Rice vs. Manley, 68 1.Y.,82)
Yet, curiously enough, these t:o ea 's are to be Found fre-
quently cited a- suI -- orting the English doct--ine of Lumley
vs. Gye, and Bowen vs. Hall, ..o. in fact they do not do so
at all.
Z t th--Ic quOst i o' whi - , " . ir - Igi.ht r
the rnere truthful persuasion of one 7 .-rty to a contract to
break it, if malicious, is actionable. As pointed out by
Coleridge, J-, in Lumley vs. Gye, if the yersuasion be fr'om
good urotives, tie interfe"enco is clea-rly not actionable.
But whether the motive be -oof or b--.., the outward act is the
same in each case. Hence if in one case the act is niot
illegal it cannot be i"lzin othe- ca, either. it is
plain then that the ba-7nd maliciois .. ., the inward and
secret workings of the mind, nmust bc the test as to whether
the action shald lieor not. The pivotal quec2tion around
which the whole matter revolves is, therW.fore, can a man be
made to answer in a coodt of law sloly for a bad motive?
Right in this connction -intoresting ti atiso might be
written uron the evolution of the (loct-r'ine of malice in the
law of torts, but si-ace,of com-e,will not .memiit. Suffice
it to say that iy the ew.ly rthe -ourts were rudi-
mentary affairs, and v'7hon the iwries ooe co,.iosed of the
neighbors who were called in to settle local quarrels and
dlisiuItes, the good or ba- motive wit. hich am. act was done
was alwa:ays the chief object of inquiry. 2 ut as civilization
has progresse!., and the Iresent syste-a of juris!-.rudcence began
to shale itself, the constant tendency has bee-, to measure
legal liability and rcs yonsibllity by exte ...... al standards,
rather than internal rur: oses. Courts have recog1nized that
they 7ere finite, anr thecrefore, fallible, ar. that attempted
ju .gments of motive alo-.e :old often be w.rong, and were
therefore dangerous. (fce Article on .lice as an Elerient of
Torts, 6 N.Y.fnr.Assn. , 135). The '1rincilple that a '"ialicious
motive will .ot transsform an act, othe-'wisc iavful, into a
legal wrong has been fremit ly ...li,, in other classes of
-. '--
oases. Thus, it has been eld that a nalicIot s aT willful
diversion, by the oefenant, of subteranoouc water on his
own lan from .djoining lan s of the ylaintiff, being an ex-
ercise of a l:vful right, is rot actioable. Phelys -s. Nowlal,
72 N.Y., 39; Forzier vs. >own, 12 0.St. , 294; Chatfield. vs.
Wilsan,, 23 Vt., 40. An,! the sa e e 1 incinle is sus-
tained by the decided weight of authority throughout the
United States. Adler vs. Fenton, 24 F.ow. , .412: Benjamin vs.
Wheeler, 8 Gray, 410; Je-nins vs. Fowler, 24 Pa.St., 308.
In the latter case, Mr. Justice Jreriiah S. lack, thus aptly
expresses the doctrine,- "'1alicious _'otives mare a bad act
worse; but they cannot mak:.e that wronZ nhich, in its on,:I
essence, is lawful. 17 en a creditor who has a just debt
, hh ice jsit deto
brings a suit or issues exection, though he oes it Out of
pure enmity to the debtor, he is safe. in slanders, if the
defendant proves the words s okeni to be true, his intention
to injure the -laintiff by proclaiming his infamy, will -ot
defeat the justification. One :ho osecutns anotho for a
crime need not shoo, in an acticn for ,alicio-s rrosecution,
that he was actuate by correct feelings if he can :rove that
there was good reason to believe the cha- trgeS well founfied.
In s"-ort, any transaction which woulc be iaw-ful and rro-e'r
if! the parties V-er friends, cannot be r-c! the foundation
of an action me-ely because they ha: en to be enemies. As
lon. a. a man hecs s himself wihin thue l] v: by moins nn act
which violates it, we irn st leave his :otives to him who
searches the heart."
11allcu, reve-ne, ani s-cite, vrmen unaccomrpanied by
any unla.ful act, c-n-t be consife--o (i v2on s which a court
of law v:ill redress; unquestionably they are vrong morally,
but the punishment for such wron-s can only be safely meted
out in the final judmaent day by the All-wise and Infallible
Judge. The allowance to any man, or set of .en, of the right
to judge by wh-,t interaral pirrose action is, in a given case,
controlled, places in their hands a dangerous engine of ower,
and it is the ;yolicy of the law to lit,-rather than increase,
such authority.
But there are ot.r reasons ,why this right of action
should not be cranteC.
One of therm is, that when tw.o r_--ties enter into a
contract, each loolrs to thae oh',and only to the other for
any da ages that iay result from a ...... of the same. If
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A., after having :'aac'e a contract ' 7t B., had a right to erect
a high stone wall around 3. , and her im shut in there until
he had' carried out his -,art of the cont, act, then there
might be some roason for -ivin- A. . rizht of action against
C. for lea--ing over such wall anK ashtinB-, to de2art from
the enclosure before he had comleted the contract. But no
such right exists. C., after B. has made his contract with
A., has just as much right to tal. v.ith him as he had before;
and if he t-alhs of the contract and says something which
causes B. to mcgLe up his own mind to brea: the contract, the
the breach is clearly the act of E., and E. alone should be
held responsible.
Further, A's -rirht to sue and -recover from D. his
damages for the breach of contract is everywhere recognze- zd
and admitted. Now, if he also has a right to sue C. , it, in
effect,gives him two causes of action, one in tort and the
other in contract, for -:reciscly the same d-amage. Inasmuch
as the two causes of action are entirely distinct, there is
no reason w1:T the glaintif f s-io-,Ai be co Ofellc to elect be-
tween them, and the fact that he had recovered in one action
would be no bar to the other action; the obvious result of
this situation woul be,. t 2 ;e'fore, that the rlaintiff could
recover fouble co-.nT en-ti:n for his injury. Under such a
state of affairs it uculd be a ositive advant age to the
plaintiff to hamre sone itsid,' 3,.aliciolisly intorf"ere with
the contract; and in this a ,e of schei- in- a: -,.rtifice, we
might be troatefl to the sectacle of ro -- ight financier
cdeliberately 't-orrelin/ -ith hs'toa_-i -. and revengeful
fellow citizen, for the xyrers rTros of rovoYing him to
a malicious interfe-ence with the cont' actsof th.e former, in
order that he might reap his double ds0mages as a result
thereof. But y erb:-ys it may be urged in defense of the
English doctrine that double compendation in damages is con-
trary to the yolicy of the w, and that r ecovery in one
action would be a bar to a recovery in the other, or would
be admissible in evidence to -ecluce d.nages in the other.
If that be so, how shall the matter be aynrortioned? 71ich
judgment shall have -reference over the other? Shall it be
left merely to the car rice of the plaintiff as to w-hich
action he shall --bofng first? These suggestions are suf-
ficient to show some of the fallacies of the English doctfine,
and where it would le-ad to, if afopted.
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Finally, we must ro-a,,Iiate the entire doctrine of
Lumley vs. Gye and 2owen vs. Hall, anl the cases following
them, as being contrary to the spirit and customs of our
times. Even the old action by the master for enticing away
his servant has outlived its purpose and its usefulness, as
indicated by Mr. Justice Smith in Rogers vs. Evarts, ante,
and would have long since been swept away as a relic of
slavery and of barbarism, were it not for the conservatism
and tenacity with which the courts cling to established pre-
cedents. The most extenuating thing that can be said in
favor of its retention is that it has been used as a sort of
peg on which to hang the very righteous cause of action by a
parent for the seduction of his daughter, and Ierhaps this is
enough to entitle it to toleration in its present state of
comparatively "innocuous desuetude." But to any attempt
to extend it beyond its nar-row confines, as the English
authorities have done, there is every reason for d-etc-rined
opposition. This is the age of freedom freedom of per-
son, freedom :f thought, freedom of' s:peech, anr freecom of
business. Tie have advanced from the era of statut to the
era of contract, and the spirit of competition is recognized
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and encouraged on every side. To concede this cause of
action is to hamer this irit, to foster, to a certain ex-
tent, the sTyirit of .-,oio-oly, and to rlace iiccalle2 for
limitations upon lejitimate business rivalry.
The conclusion of this sreculativB fiiscussion is,
therefore, that malLcious intereoence with contract, when
unaccompauied by f'-od, false rer"rseritations, or coerbion,
is not a legal wrong for which an action will lie. And a
fitting end is to be found in the following quotations from
the opinions of Lewis, J., of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in the two cases Treviously referred to, 15 S.f.Rci., 57, 60.
"Competition frequently engenders, not only a
spirit of rivalry, but enmity; and, if the motive influencing
every business transaction that may result in injury or in-
convenience to a business rival was made the test of its le-
gality, litigation and strife would be vexatiously and un-
necessarily increased, and the sale and exchange of commod-
ities very much hindercd. "
"It is not the -olicy of the law to restrict or
discourage comp- tition in any business or occupation, whether
concerning propeety or personial service, there being -o good
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reason for making more stringent regulations, in respect to
the latter, except where some one of the domestic relations
exist, thar the former; for if, in ordcr tc have sale and ex-
change of property fzree and unrestrained, a person anay law-
fully arid without legal inquisition of his motive, buy what
another offers for sale, and has a right to sell, it is no
less just and expedient that, in order to have fair reom~ner-
ation for labor, a person be allowed to hire the service of
any one sui juris who offers to be hired. And in every
case, the employer shoulC be required to look alone to the
person employed for bteach of the contract, just as the
seller must look to the buyer, and the creditor to the debtor,
in default of payment; for t. enforce a doctrine making the
hirer responsible for bteach, by the person hired, of a pre-
vious contract with another involves legal recognition of per-
sonal dominion, bordering on pure servitude, which is neither
in harmony with our form of governnent nor well for those
who labor for subsistence.,'
